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MISCELLANEA 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CENTRE AND PERIPHERY: A BRIEF SURVEY OF GRAND 
STRATEGIES
1
 AND MILITARY STRATEGIES
2
 FOCUSED 
ON PERIPHERIAL THEATRES OF OPERATIONS (PTOs) 
 
FLORIN DIACONU 
 
 
 
Centre and periphery are important concepts, each of them with several 
different meanings in International Relations and Strategic Studies (including 
Geopolitics and Geo-strategy). These two concepts – together with the 
immensely significant political reality they are correlated with, that of national 
(or state) power
3
 – are useful tools enabling an effective, complex and flexible 
understanding of the way in which war is (or is not) an adequate political tool, 
able (or, on the contrary, not able) to accomplish major geo-strategic goals 
(which are very important elements of the national interest
4
 in its dynamics). 
 
 
Centre and periphery: three major different meanings 
 
According to some authors, the two concepts are to be evaluated mainly 
in terms of global economics (economic modernity and industrial output): 
                                                          
1  The meaning of grand strategy is, in the context of this study, that one presented by 
B. H. Liddell Hart – an effort to properly mobilize and coordinate all the resources of a nation 
(or those of alliance) in order to accomplish the political goals of the war. For this definition see 
B. H. LIDDELL HART, Strategia. Acţiunile indirecte, Ed. Militară, Bucureşti, 1973, p. 334; for other 
definitions of strategy and grand strategy see EDWARD N. LUTTWAK. Strategy. The logic of 
war and peace, The Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and 
London, England, 1987.  
2  Military strategy is a concept designating the ability of military commanders to win wars. 
The more military victories are, the larger become the chances that political goals will be reached 
in the end. For a more complex and flexible definition of military strategy, as an element (or 
instrument) of grand strategy, see B. H. LIDDELL HART, Strategia. Acţiunile indirecte, Ed. 
Militară, Bucureşti, 1973, p. 331-343.  
3  For the definition of national power and a detailed presentation of its constitutive 
elements, see HANS J. MORGENTHAU, Politics among nations. The struggle for power and 
peace, third edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1964, pp. 27-31 and 110-148.  
4  For a brief definition of national interest, see JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., Descifrarea 
conflictelor internaţionale. Teorie şi istorie, Ed. Antet XX Press, Bucureşti, 2005, pp. 53-54.  
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centrality is, according to such authors, in many occasions and directly 
connected with the more modern and more developed ability to produce a lot of 
manufactured goods of all sorts, while peripheral status is directly associated 
with the ability of producing only raw materials to be used by the centre(s)
5
. 
Such a thinking pattern clearly leads us to understand that centre = (or means) 
modernity and centre = development, while periphery = underdevelopment. The 
fact that peripheral status of some regions (states) is a direct result of 
insufficient modernity (development) is presented with a lot of significant 
details by some works analysing major trends in Eastern Europe. John R. 
Lampe, for example, the author of an important part of a collective volume 
called The origins of backwardness in Eastern Europe, formulates – and then 
offers a detailed answer to – an interesting question: the lack of modernity and 
development in the Balkans along several centuries (between the early stages of 
the 16
th
 century and 1914, to be more accurate) is to be studied in terms of 
“imperial frontier” or in terms of “capitalist periphery”?6 
Other authors, on the contrary, focus the attention mainly on the geographic 
meaning of the two concepts. For such authors, both centrality and peripheral 
status are of almost geometric nature: the geographic/geometric core of a region 
(continent) is the centre, while actors on the placed far away from the centre, 
on the outer rim of that region, do have peripheral status. This is the type of 
logic which led politicians and historians to call Central Powers the mighty 
political and military alliance build by Germany at the end of the 19
th
 century. 
A third way of using the concepts centre and periphery is that one focusing 
almost the entire attention on the relative or absolute significance of actors on 
the international arena. According to such a vision, centre is a concept used to 
designate the group of major powers, with global interests and global 
capabilities, while periphery designates the very large group of minor powers, 
lacking both global interests and global capabilities. A third category – semi-
periphery – exists as well, say those using this paradigm, and it groups both 
former elements of the centre (former great powers now in clear decline), and 
emerging powers within the periphery, and also regional powers (too powerful 
to naturally belong to periphery, but also too weak to fully belong to the 
centre)
7
. Such a thinking pattern means that centre/centrality = (or means) very 
                                                          
5  JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN, JOHN C. PEVEHOUSE, Relaţii internaţionale, Ed. Polirom, 
Iaşi, 2008, p. 606. According to some economists, clearly state these two authors, centre(s) and 
periphery(ies) are not clearly separated; sometimes, within the periphery some centres do exist, 
while central regions have their own less developed areas (peripheries).  
6  JOHN R. LAMPE, “Frontieră imperială sau periferie capitalistă? Despre cum trebuie 
definită înapoierea balcanică între 1520 şi 1914”, in Daniel Chirot (coord.), Originile înapoierii în 
Europa de Est, Ed. Corint, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 219-253.  
7  For such a structure of the international system, see IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, Sistemul 
mondial modern, I-IV, Ed. Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1992-1993, but also a more recent and very 
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significant (or even main, leading) role on the international arena, while 
periphery/peripheral status = only secondary role on the international arena. In 
direct correlation with such a thinking pattern, what some authors call geo-strategic 
players do naturally belong to the centre (are major actors), while geo-political 
pivots are peripheral (secondary) elements of the international arena
8
 
Along the following pages, I will systematically use elements belonging 
mainly to the second and the third ways of understanding the problems of centre 
and periphery. I mean by this that, within the framework of this study, the 
concept central theatre of operations (CTO) designates a significant geo-
strategic reality with some obvious features: it is placed directly between the 
two competitors we are speaking about (which means geographic/geometric 
centrality – see, for example, the case of north eastern France as a CTO in the 
context of the war between France and Prussia at 1870-1871); it has a major 
(potentially even vital) strategic importance for both competitors; it absorbs the 
largest part of available military resources of both competitors (in terms of 
manpower, strategically significant technologies, logistic support, reinforcements). 
Quite clearly, in such a situation peripheral theatre of operations (PTO) is to 
designate a geo-strategic reality with a different set of features: it is not 
necessarily placed directly between the two competitors (so that it embodies 
what we can accurately call peripheral geographic status/position, which is the 
opposite of geometric/geographic centrality of the CTO); it is not vitally 
important (or at least it is not regarded to be so, mainly in the opening stages of 
the conflict); it does not absorb the largest part of the available resources of the 
competitors; in spite of all these, the military and political consequences of major 
and clear victories on these PTOs can be really immense (sometimes clearly 
larger than even the consequences of major events taking place on CTOs). 
In order to better understand all these I selected four significant historical 
examples. Two of them (the case of Athens in the 5
th
 century B.C. and that of Alexander 
the Great) are from Ancient Times; a third one is from the end of the 18
th
 and early 
stages of the 19
th
 century (in the era dominated by the political and military 
plans and deeds of Napoleon Bonaparte) and the fourth one is belonging to the 
20
th
 century (the naval PTOs in World War I). These four examples clearly have 
both a strong common denominator (which is the significant role of PTOs) and 
major differences (technologies used, the very nature of political regimes 
involved, size of armed forces, nature of political and military goals etc). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
brief text: ANDREI MIROIU, “Evoluţia sistemului internaţional până în 1914”, in Andrei Miroiu, 
Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu (coord.), Manual de relaţii internaţionale, Ed. Polirom, Iaşi, 2006, p. 17.  
8 For these two concepts – geo-strategic active players and geo-strategic pivots – see 
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, Marea tablă de şah. Supremaţia americană şi imperativele sale 
geostrategice, Ed. Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 2000, pp. 53-55.  
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Athens and PTOs in the Peloponnesian War (5
th
 century B.C.) 
 
Athens, mainly as a result of major domestic political changes (above all 
the decision to implement what we call now democracy) quickly consolidated 
its power status (both by sharply increasing the total number of citizens with 
political rights and with the correlated military responsibilities and by massively 
developing the Navy, in which very large numbers of poor city dwellers were 
used as rowers), managing to become the dominant power
9
 in the Aegean region 
and to maintain this extraordinary geo-strategic position for several decades
10
. 
In several occasions, Athenian political decision-makers and commanding 
generals cleverly used PTOs. The most important competitor Athens had to 
cope with, after the moment when the Persian Empire had been badly defeated 
in 480-479 BC, was Sparta, with an enormous military potential (large and very 
strong land army) and with a huge political prestige. The geographic distance 
between Sparta and Athens was quite small (less than 200 miles, across the 
Corinth Isthmus, a situation strongly resembling that of the more recent civil 
War in USA, with the Federal capital and the Confederate capital separated by 
only 160 kilometres
11
). The Athenians never attempted to directly threaten or 
attack Sparta along the shortest possible route, so that what we call CTO was 
not very much used (with the significant exceptions of the early massive 
invasions of Attica by land armies of Sparta). On the contrary, PTOs were 
extensively used. Athens skilfully used the huge potential of a PTO in the Black 
Sea area (the core elements of this PTO were major trade lines and the wheat 
producers on the shores of the Black Sea; as long as the crops were fine and the 
trade routes open, Athens – able to properly feed its quite large population – had 
all the chances to survive and maintain its exceptional power status, even if 
militarily defeated). The Black Sea PTO had been consolidated by a massive 
naval and political mission led by Pericles himself, a few years before the 
Peloponnesian War. Plutarch describes with all necessary details the major 
naval raid led by Pericles. A very large fleet was used. And – clearly stated 
Plutarch – the political gains were enormous, matching the vast resources used: 
several city-states asked the Athenians to act as protectors and/or mediators; the 
barbarian kings on the shores of Black Sea had the occasion to see with their 
own eyes how powerful Athens was; political and strategic area of influence 
was significantly extended; a quite important squadron, 13 ships strong (which 
means more than 2,200 crew members and up to 200 heavily armoured 
                                                          
9  For various power statuses and their basic features (great power, dominant power, world power, 
minor power, etc), see MARTIN WIGHT, Politica de putere, Ed. Arc, Chişinău, 1998, pp. 31-75.  
10  For the evolution of Athens in the 5th century BC, see J. B. BURY, RUSSELL MEIGGS, 
Istoria Greciei până la moartea lui Alexandru cel Mare, ediţia a IV-a revăzută, Ed. BIC ALL, Bucureşti, 
2006, pp. 127-322; and RUSSELL MEIGGS, The Athenian Empire, Oxford University Press, 1979.  
11  ALAN FARMER, Războiul civil american, 1861-1865, Ed. BIC ALL, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 35-36.  
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warriors) was left to support the emerging democratic regime at Sinope (on the 
northern shores of Asia Minor) in the fight against the former ruler, tyrant 
Timesilaos. When the democrats prevailed in the end, Pericles immediately sent 
600 colonists to reside at Sinope, boosting even more the already very potent 
Athenian influence in PTO we are speaking about, the Black Sea area
12
. There 
is a definite correlation of the obvious and major success of the massive raid in 
the Black Sea area and the history of the direct confrontation of Athens with 
Sparta. For more than 25 years, the Athenians managed to maintain complete 
control of the Straits, of the wheat trade and of the minor allies in the Black Sea 
area. As a direct result of all these, Athens managed to overcome both defeats, 
and military blunders and natural disasters (as the plague which killed a large 
share of the population, together with the so ambitious and gifted Pericles). 
Only in the final stages of the Peloponnesian War, a Spartan political and 
military leader managed to understand that defeating Athens is possible only by 
severing its communications and trade routes with the PTO in the Black Sea 
area. Xenophon presents with lots of details the way in which the war came to 
an end: in spite of the fact that the financial situation of the state was already 
very difficult, the Athenians were still able to deploy in the region of the Straits 
180 triremes led by Conon. The Spartan fleet, led by Lysandros, had more than 
200 warships. Directly threatening the trade routes vital for Athens, Lysandros 
made the Athenians to engage in a battle they lost (the battle at Aegospotami, in 
405 B.C.), mainly as a direct result of logistics: Athenian crews were on shore, too 
seek for food, when the Spartans suddenly attacked and easily captured 171 ships. 
Quite soon, as long as the mastery of open seas was not any more belonging to 
the Athenians, several major allies of Athens in the Aegean Sea area were 
forced to surrender and Athens itself, blocked and starved, accepted a peace 
severely diminishing its power status
13
.  
Another interesting – and significant – PTO was that in the lower part of 
the Adriatic Sea (what we usually call the Ionian Sea). Athens deployed there a 
small squadron (led in several occasions by talented admirals, including Phormio, 
probably the most effective naval commander along the entire Peloponnesian War), 
first of all to help Corcyra against Corinth. This deployment of very limited 
resources to a distant and secondary PTO led in the end to several major naval 
engagements, with strategic and political consequences larger than the 
aggregate costs of the resources (ships, crews, cost of logistical support) used. 
Corcyra managed to survive and remained for a long time a loyal ally of 
Athens; and the sea trade of the Peloponnesians was blocked as a direct result of 
two major victories won by Phormio. In 429 BC, several dozen Peloponnesian 
ships were defeated at Rhion. Then, with only 20 triremes, Phormio managed to 
                                                          
12  For all these, see PLUTARH, “Pericles”, in Vieţi Paralele, I, Ed. Ştiinţifică, Bucureşti, 1960, XX 
(p. 207), and also RUSSELL MEIGGS, The Athenian Empire, pp. 197-199.  
13  XENOFON, Helenicele, Ed. Ştiinţifică, Bucureşti, 1965, II, 1, 20-II, 2, 10.  
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defeat another large Peloponnesian fleet, 77 ships strong, at Naupaktos. Four 
years later, in 425, the same PTO became the stage of one of the most 
humiliating defeats Sparta ever suffered: 120 hoplites were forced to surrender 
on the tiny island of Pylos, together with other 172 allied hoplites from other 
Peloponnesian city-states (a share of almost 75% of the 420 hoplites which had 
had landed on Pylos and had had been blocked and besieged for 72 days)
14
. 
Sicily was the third PTO which was, in the end, more important than 
expected for the final outcome of the Peloponnesian War. Geographically 
speaking, it was far away from Greece. If we speak about resources, its value 
was minimal for both sides (as long as Sparta was agriculturally self-sustainable 
and Athens still had free access to the wheat coming from another PHO, the 
Black Sea area. But some of the Athenian leaders designed a too ambitious 
grand strategic design: to capture Sicily (and, if possible, even Carthage
15
) in 
order to enhance even more the power of Athens (and in order to deny the 
Spartans – with Dorian ancestors – the chance to operate a strategic partnership 
with Syracuse, which were Dorians too). We have to take into account the fact 
that, at least in Alcibiade‟s mind, conquest of Sicily was just a step leading to 
larger goals: to “build up an Athenian empire in the west… and then, with the 
overwhelming resources of the west, to crush the Peloponnese”16. The fact that 
this plan was poorly implemented is almost irrelevant for our debate; had it 
been at least partially successful, another distant PTO could have become an 
extra positive asset for the Athenian imperial policies. The Sicilian expedition 
is, anyhow, important from another perspective as well: it proves that even 
failure (defeat) on PTOs can generate, up to a certain point, positive results for 
both sides. The winners (Sparta) gained extra prestige, while the losers (Athens) 
won something too: for some time, very important resources (ships, land forces 
and skilled generals) of their main foes were deployed to (and used on) a 
peripheral theatre of operations (PTO), far away from the real central theatre of 
operations (CTO) in the Aegean and on land, in southern central Greece. 
In the end, the synergetic geo-strategic value of PTOs led to a peculiar 
situation: in spite of being not decisively defeated on the CTO (either on land or 
at sea), Athens lost the Peloponnesian War as a direct result of being defeated, 
several times in a row, on different PTOs (in Sicily and later on in the region of 
the Straits linking the Aegean with the Black Sea area).  
 
 
                                                          
14  For all these, see HELMUT PEMSEL, Von Salamis bis Okinawa. Eine Chronik zur 
Seekriegsgeschichte, J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, Munchen, 1975, p. 20. For a very suggestive and detailed 
description of the battle off Naupaktos, see THUCYDIDES, Războiul peloponesiac, Ed. Ştiinţifică, 
Bucureşti, 1966, II, 86-92. For the episode at Pylos, see THUCYDIDES, op. cit., IV, 29-38.  
15  THUCYDIDES, op. cit., VI, 15-18 (mainly the speech of Alcibiades in front of the Assembly).  
16  RUSSELL MEIGGS, The Athenian Empire, pp. 346-347.  
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PTOs in the era of Alexander the Great 
 
Peripheral theatres of operations (PTOs) were significant elements in the 
grand strategy and military strategy of Alexander the Great. As a preliminary 
step of his major campaigns against the Persian Empire, the young Macedonian 
king led a massive raid to the north, in Illyria and then across the Balkans and 
across the Danube. Arrianus vividly present, with a lot of useful details, the 
Macedonian actions on this peripheral theatre of operations (PTO). The main 
strategic goal of these Alexander‟s early military campaigns was to defeat 
several powerful and aggressive tribes in the north, before starting his Asian 
expedition. He attacked to the North in order to deny the barbarians any chance 
to threaten or to harm Macedonia, even if the largest part of its troops were to 
be deployed far away for many years
17
. A second goal (one Arrianus does not 
mention) must have been that of showing the Greeks that the young king is 
resolute and able to successfully lead military campaigns. The march to the 
Balkans was very short, only ten days long
18
, so that the local Thracian tribes 
were unable to concentrate all their forces and to organize a successful defence. 
Skilfully using both the heavily armoured infantry (the phalanx) together with 
his light troops and heavy cavalry (including the elite Companions), Alexander 
killed more than 1,500 enemies and captured many hostages. Quickly advancing 
to the Danube, the Macedonians attacked another large Thracian army and 
defeated it. The combat losses were clearly unbalanced (a clear sign of what 
strategic and tactical surprise can generate, both on CTOs and PTOs): while the 
barbarians lost more than 3,000 warriors, the Macedonians lost only 51 (40 of 
them foot soldiers and 11 cavalrymen)
19
. The final stage of this astonishingly 
quick strategic raid led the Macedonians across the Danube, in the southern part 
of what is now Romania. The local Thracians managed to concentrate almost 
15,000 men (almost a third of them on horseback) and hoped that with such 
large an army they could easily stop the Macedonians, while Alexander could 
cross the river with only 1,500 elite cavalrymen and 4,000 other soldiers 
(including some units of his mighty, even if quite slow, phalanx)
20
. In spite of 
being smaller, the Macedonian force was superbly led, armed and trained. It 
quite quickly advanced to a fortified village, making the locals to completely 
abandon their positions. The fortified village was deliberately destroyed by the 
Macedonians and quite large amounts of goods were captured. The results of 
these victories were immediate and important: other barbarian rulers on the 
shores of Danube decided not to confront Alexander and became allies of him
21
 
                                                          
17  ARRIANUS, Expediţia lui Alexandru cel Mare în Asia, Ed. Ştiinţifică, Bucureşti, 1966, I, 1, 3.   
18  Ibid., I, 1, 5.  
19  Ibid., I, 2, 7.  
20  Ibid., I, 3, 5-6.  
21  Ibid., I, 4, 1-8.  
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(an early but significant example of what we call today bandwagoning
22
). As a 
consequence of all these “astonishing campaigns”23 against the “wild tribes”, 
the western and northern PTOs were properly and completely secured, so that 
Alexander could concentrate all his forces to start his campaign against Persia, 
swiftly advancing to the CTO in Asia, after defeating the last major rebellion in 
Greece. The episode shows how important victories on peripheral theatres of 
operations (PTOs) can be, simply by allowing the winner to concentrate all (or 
almost all) resources of all sorts to more important theatres of operations (TOs). 
The peripheral theatres of operations (PTOs) were to play an important 
role in the next stage of Alexander‟s actions as well. In the opening stages of the 
campaign against Persia, he had the chance to completely destroy, in early 
summer of 334 B.C., an entire army (almost twice larger than his own one) at 
Granicus
24
, a naturally strong position within the central theatre of operations 
(CTO). After this early success, he decided to pursue a peripheral grand (and 
military) strategy, aiming to conquer the entire western part of the Persian 
Empire. His most obvious intention was “to wrest the command of the sea from 
the Persians, not by destroying their fleet, for he had not the means to do so, but 
by occupying all its ports and bases on the shores of the eastern Mediterranean. 
His formidable task took him two years to accomplish”25. Such an intention was 
strategically sound, mainly because newly appointed commander of the Persian 
forces, Memnon, was already trying to counterattack in Greece and Macedonia, 
across the Aegean Sea
26
. But Alexander managed to defend both his 
overextended lines of communications and the chances of success for his 
peripheral military strategy by defeating a second major Persian army at Issus
27
. 
After that, he quickly advanced to Phoenicia, another peripheral region of the 
Persian Empire, conquering all its major cities and ports. Some modern authors 
clearly state that the decision to go to peripheral Phoenicia and not directly to 
the very core regions of Persia was “dictated” to him by grand strategy28. After 
successfully besieging the mighty island city of Tyre (and peacefully integrating 
other Phoenician major cities and fleets within his emerging empire), Alexander 
                                                          
22  For the meaning of bandwagoning (“alignment with the source of danger”) and for its role 
in alliance generating processes, see STEPHEN M. WALT, Originile alianţelor, Ed. Institutul 
European, Iaşi, 2008, pp. 57-75.  
23  J. F. C. FULLER, Major General, A military history of the Western World, volume I: 
From the earliest times to the battle of Lepanto, Da Capo Press, 1987, p. 91.  
24  ARRIANUS, I, 13-16 (the Persians lost some 1,000 cavalrymen and up to 18,000 mercenary 
Greek hoplites, while the Macedonians lost only 115 soldiers, more than 50% of them belonging 
to the elite heavy cavalry led by the young king himself).  
25  J. F. C. FULLER, Major General, op. cit., vol. I, p. 93.  
26  ARRIANUS, op. cit., II, 1, 1.  
27  Ibid., II, 7-11 (again, the Macedonian combat casualties were quite small, while the 
Persians lost not only a very large number of soldiers, but also a huge amount of cash – some 
3,000 talents – and also several members of the imperial family, captured by the Macedonians).  
28  B. H. LIDDELL HART, op. cit., p. 20.  
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went on with his grand strategic design, aiming to conquer another peripheral 
region, Egypt. Only after consolidating his authority in that peripheral former 
province of the Persian Empire, Alexander boldly advanced, with a quite small 
army, to the central regions of Persian state – and to what we can call the 
natural (and obvious) central theatre of operations (CTO) of the entire 
campaign. Quite soon, he engaged the Persian army in another major battle, that 
at Arbela (Gaugamela)
29
, in which he defeated again his opponents. 
Peripheral theatres of operations (PTOs) played again a significant role in 
Alexander‟s plans and deeds in the final stages of his imperial conquests. 
Massive strategic raids were launched, in several successive occasions, against 
foes threatening some of the vulnerable peripheral provinces (and borders) of 
the new Macedonian Empire. In some occasions, these PTOs absorbed more 
resources than previously expected and generated immensely difficult 
challenges (really huge distances
30
, heavily fortified settlements to be 
conquered, severe logistic problems, extreme weather conditions of all sorts, 
plus difficult terrain – including some of the tallest mountains in Eurasia and 
several major deserts to be crossed). To better understand how demanding and 
dangerous military and political actions on these PTOs could be, it is useful to 
remember, for example, that Alexander himself was wounded not only at Issus 
(a clearly minor hip wound
31
), but also (more severely, by an arrow which 
punctured the upper part of his body armour) in such a quite late raid against the 
aggressive tribes from the present north-western India or eastern Pakistan
32
. 
Later on, in the context of the very difficult fights against the large kingdoms of 
India, Alexander lost in battle his beloved horse and was wounded again (this 
time a really dangerous wound, a heavy arrow penetrating, through the frontal 
armour, his breastbone; a few minutes later he was wounded again, several 
times, and started to falter when his companions came to rescue him)
33
. 
 
 
PTOs in the era of Napoleon Bonaparte 
 
In the era of the French Revolution and of the 1
st
 French Empire, two central 
theatres of operations (CTOs) were immensely important: the north-eastern one, that 
between France and its mighty continental and conservative powers, financially and 
politically supported by London (we are speaking about powers as Prussia, Austria 
                                                          
29  J. F. C. FULLER, Major General, op. cit., I, pp. 96-106.  
30  The Macedonian army marched “some 17,000 miles” (which means more than 27,200 km.), 
most of them after defeating the Persian Empire. For this figure see J. F. C. FULLER, Major General, 
op. cit., I, p. 109.  
31  ARRIANUS, op. cit., II, 12, 1.  
32  Ibid., IV, 23, 3.  
33  PLUTARH, “Alexandru”, in Vieţi paralele,  IX (Alexandru şi Cezar), Ed. Ştiinţifică, 
Bucureşti, 1957, LXI and LXIII, and ARRIANUS, op. cit., V, 14, 4-5 and VI, 10, 1-3.  
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and Russia) and the western one, with its core region in the part of the Atlantic separating 
France and England. On the other hand, several peripheral theatres of operations (PTOs) 
proved themselves to be areas of direct and intense confrontation of France with its foes.  
But significant campaigns (sometimes generating significant consequences) 
were also fought on different peripheral theatres of operations (PTOs). The 
earliest one was that in Italy, in 1796-1797. Control of Lombardy (northern 
Italy) could generate at least two positive strategic consequences for the French: 
first of all, Austria could be threatened – or even attached – on two fronts, if 
Lombardy was in French hands; and secondly, French control of Lombardy 
could be a major and effective buffer zone protecting large shares of the 
territory controlled by Paris, simply by denying the Austrians the chance to 
easily invade south-eastern France. More than this, control of Italy could easily 
lead to other positive (and very attractive) consequences. The economic 
potential of the territory was high, so that an army of 400,000 soldiers could be 
easily logistically supported. More than this, a proper defence of the peninsula 
against enemies invading from Switzerland or Austria/Germany could be done 
with at most 200,000 soldiers
34
, so that controlling Italy directly led to increased 
chances to mobilize extra soldiers for active (aggressive) campaigns in other 
regions of Europe. But Italy had also a geographic position and a naval tradition 
potentially enabling it to generate a large Navy (with combined crews, 
estimated Napoleon himself, of 120,000 sailors and gunners)
35
. The Italian 
campaign in 1796-1797 (in which a French army with only 30,000 soldiers and 
30 guns defeated 80.000 Austrians with 200 guns
36
, later on heavily reinforced 
by Vienna, and several heavily defended fortresses) generated, in spite of the 
minimal resources used by the French, huge strategic benefits for Paris: the 
frontier on the Rhine became more secure; France gained supplementary 
influence in Italy; the French army absorbed a large number of precious 
volunteers; many weapons were captured; a large part of the costs of war were 
covered, in a way or another, by either the defeated Austrians or by the 
„liberated‟ Italians37. More than this, the Italian campaign in 1996-1797 clearly 
shows us, if we carefully explore the strategic decisions and actions of the 
Austrians, what types of strategic (political and military) mistakes can be done 
when making war on peripheral theatres of operations (PTOs), and how huge 
the consequences of such mistakes can be. In such a context, we have to 
remember that the most important mistake the Austrians did was that of 
“mobilizing only a segment of the forces available, mobilizing a second 
                                                          
34  For these figures, see NAPOLEON, Memorii, I, Ed. Militară, Bucureşti, 1981, p. 53.  
35  For the really significant naval potential of Italy, see ibid., I, pp. 54-55.  
36  For the strength of the two armies, see ibid., p. 62.  
37  For all these, see ibid., pp. 199-205. 
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segment after the first had been defeated, and then a third”, instead of using “the 
fullest employment of all means available”38. 
A second campaign fought by Napoleon on a clearly peripheral theatre of 
operations (PTO) was that aiming to conquer Egypt, in order to use this country 
as a land base against England‟s strategic interests in India. At that very 
moment, the central theatre of operations (CTO) was that in the Atlantic and in 
the English Channel. The French military commanders and political decision 
makers thought that the major goal to be accomplished is to defeat Great Britain, 
by means of a large landing operation able to project a large French army across the 
Channel. In order to increase the chances of success on the CTO, the French designed 
a strategic plan with three elements: first of all, bold attack were to be launched 
against two PTOs: that in Ireland (where a French army with 30,000 soldiers 
could improve the chances of approximately 100,000 Irish insurgents) and that 
in Egypt (where another quite small army, also with 30,000 soldiers, could 
establish a major strategic base across the sea, at the opposite end of the 
Mediterranean, in order to threaten – or, if possible, to conquer – the British 
colonies in India. The French thought that, while fighting these campaigns on 
two PTOs several thousand miles apart, a huge window of opportunity will 
occur: the British will be forced to use an important part of their strategic 
reserves to defend both PTOs, Ireland and India; they will also use a quite large 
part of their mighty Navy to transport soldiers to Ireland and India; in such a 
situation, the CTO was to automatically become more vulnerable (because of 
two different reasons: British naval forces protecting the British shores against a 
landing operation were to become smaller, if many ships were to be deployed 
for operations aiming to defend Ireland and India; and also because the massive 
French army, with 150,000 soldiers concentrated around ports in the Channel 
area, could land in a Britain less protected than before, with many of its soldiers 
already deployed far away from the CTO, in order to stop the advance of the 
French on the PTOs)
39
. In spite of its final failure, this strategic design led to an 
overextension of the British forces (so that forces protecting British homeland 
territories became clearly weaker). For example, when Napoleon started his Egyptian 
campaign (which started in 1798 and came to an end in 1799), the British were 
forced to deploy a quite large share of their Navy in the Mediterranean, far 
away from the CTO in the Channel. Nelson was given 13 (other authors wrote 
about 14) ships of the line to hunt and destroy the French fleet, this number 
representing approximately 12% of the 115
40
 heavy ships of the British Navy at 
that very moment (again, quite large a share of all available forces of a state 
are operating on a distant peripheral theatre of operations).  
                                                          
38  PETER PARET, “Napoleon and the Revolution in War”, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of 
modern strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 129.  
39  For this bold and clever strategic plan, see NAPOLEON, op. cit., I, pp. 252-253.  
40  For these figures, see HELMUT PEMSEL, op. cit., p. 154.  
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A third campaign led by Napoleon on a PTO was that in Italy, in 1800. 
This time, the Austrian army was not any more a weak one, as in 1796. On the 
contrary, it was “powerful and very well equipped”41. Skilfully and swiftly 
moving his own forces in northern Italy, Napoleon managed to occupy a strong 
position behind the main enemy line of resistance, threatening the entire rear of 
the Austrian armies. Later on, at Marengo, he managed to defeat the Austrians 
(even if with very heavy losses) and the synergetic consequences of military 
victories on the Italian CTO and of the obvious weaknesses inside the 2
nd
 
coalition made the Austrian morale to collapse and the Austrian decision 
makers to accept to evacuate Lombardy
42
. Again, significant results on a PTO 
led to major changes in the evolution of the entire war. And the dimensions of 
the consequences of major victory on the Italian PTO is strongly underlined by 
the very fact that roughly 100,000 foes of the revolution who took refuge abroad 
for many years were granted the permission to come back to France
43
 (so 
important were the strategic and above all political results gained at Marengo, 
on a PTO, that both domestic problems and foreign pressures suddenly became 
realities easier to cope with and officially regarded with more optimism).  
Spain was to become, for several years, another significant PTO, 
absorbing quite important French resources of all sorts and generating 
significant strategic and political consequences, both for France and for the 
powers Paris was directly challenging. In a way, Spain was for France, in the 
early stages of the 19
th
 century, exactly what Vietnam was to become for USA a 
century and a half later: a peripheral theatre of operations (PTO), far away 
from the major CTO of the confrontation (territories along an imaginary line 
linking Paris and Moscow, in the era of Napoleon, and Europe, in the era of the 
Cold War); a country where the effectiveness of regular warfare and regular 
troops was directly challenges by guerrillas and irregulars of all sorts; a country 
popular resistance against a vastly superior enemy was deliberately boosted by 
another foreign major power (Spaniards were helped a lot in their fight against 
Napoleon by the direct – and larger and larger – military involvement of Great 
Britain, while the Vietnamese were  granted a lot of help – mainly in terms of 
military hardware, for example – by the Soviet Union). One of the most 
important features of the Spanish campaigns in the era of Napoleon is that it 
absorbed more and more resources, that there is no positive correlation between 
the amount of resources used and the results generated by their use. In the end, 
the peripheral theatre of operations (PTO) in Spain eroded in an exceptionally 
effective way the military might – and the prestige – of France. We have to 
accept that, without the “Spanish ulcer”44, Napoleon might have been able to 
                                                          
41  E. V. TARLE, Napoleon, ediţia a III-a, Ed. pentru Literatură Universală, Bucureşti, 1964, p. 100.  
42  B. H. LIDDELL HART, op. cit., pp. 112-113 
43  E. V. TARLE, op. cit., p. 110.  
44  B. H. LIDDELL HART, op. cit., p. 118.  
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attack Russia, in 1812 (his main enemy, on the central theatre of operations – CTO), 
with more and better troops. So that, another correlation occurs: sometimes, 
challenging /difficult situations on PTOs force the political and military 
decision makers to deploy there more and more resources (mainly troops and 
military hardware). But such decisions do not automatically lead to success; on 
the contrary, they can harm a lot the capabilities of the great power acting 
aggressively on that PTO, denying it the chances to decisively act on the CTO 
(simply because any extra soldier sent to the PTO we are speaking about 
significantly erodes the capabilities to be used on the CTO). 
 
 
Naval PTOs in World War I 
 
At sea, the central theatre of operations (CTO) was, from the very 
beginning of World War I, that in the North Sea. That was the tiny spot of the 
World Ocean where the probability of a direct and major clash of the Grand 
Fleet (the largest part of British Navy, concentrated at Scapa Flow in the 
Orkneys) with the German Hochseeflotte remained high almost to the very end 
of hostilities. That was the region where the most important naval engagements 
of the war were fought: Battle in the Heligoland Bight (August 28, 1914), battle 
of Doggerbank (January 24, 1915) and battle of Jutland (Skagerrak, in many 
history books)
45
, fought in 1916 (May 31-June 1).  
But in several occasions, naval peripheral theatres of operations (PTOs) 
were the stage on which violent (and potentially very important) clashes took 
place. The best known ones are directly associated with the operational 
decisions of Admiral Maximilian von Spee. In the opening stages of the war, he 
became commander in chief of a heterogeneous squadron, made up of two 
modern battle-cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (12,000 tons each, armed 
with eight 8 in. guns) and three other smaller warships. In order to generate as 
much as possible confusion and panic (and in order to sharply increase the 
chances of his main battle group to freely operate), Spee detached the light 
cruiser Emden “to prey on Allied merchant shipping” in the Indian Ocean. 
Emden‟s captain brilliantly accomplished his orders. Between September and 
early November 1914, Emden (a light cruiser with a total displacement of only 
3,600 tons) managed to sink or to capture merchant ships of the Entente with a 
total displacement of almost 70.000 tons, plus several warships. In the end, 
Emden was crippled and sunk by a larger and better armed Australian cruiser, 
Sydney, on November 9, 1914. Anyhow, the effectiveness of the quite weak 
                                                          
45  For a detailed analysis of the battles of Helgoland Bight, Doggerbank and Jutland (but also of 
the broad picture of the naval competition and of the arms race of Germany and Great Britain), see 
JOHN COSTELLO, TERRY HUGHES, Jutland 1916, Futura Publications Limited, 1976; for the tactical 
aspects of these battles see (text and very detailed maps) HELMUT PEMSEL, op. cit., pp. 204-213.  
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German raider, operating alone, for almost three months, on a distant PTO, 
had been astonishingly high: for several weeks, merchant shipping was almost 
stopped in large areas of the Indian Ocean; the Australians were forced to 
organize large – and expensive, in terms of money and time – escorted convoys 
to protect their troop transports; and, above all, the British Admiralty had to 
organize a massive and very expensive hunt, using almost 70 warships to find 
and destroy the Emden 
46
. 
At the same time, the rest of von Spee‟s squadron tried to reach another 
peripheral theatre of operations (PTO), that in South Atlantic, in order to harm – or, 
if possible, even to severe – the sea routes so important for the British Empire47. 
On the road from the Central Pacific to the South Atlantic, Spee destroyed (on 
the evening of November 1
st
, 1914), off Chile, at Coronel, a British squadron 
(three old cruisers and an auxiliary one) under the command of Rear-Admiral 
Christopher Craddock. As a direct result of this action, British authorities 
decided to immediately send to South Atlantic (the obvious target of any move 
von Spee could do after Coronel) two mighty very modern capital ships. The 
Inflexible and the Invincible, large and well armed battle-cruisers, were selected 
for this mission. They sailed at full speed to the Falklands, reaching the islands 
on December the 7
th
, together with three older armoured cruisers and three light 
ones. Next day, von Spee‟s squadron appeared off Port Stanley and the battle 
was quickly engaged. The British battle-cruisers (each of them with a 
displacement of 20,125 tons, full load and armed with 8 12 in. guns) quickly 
outgunned the German ones (each of them with a displacement of only 11,600 
tons and armed with smaller, 8 in. guns)
48
. So that, in the end the entire German 
squadron was destroyed, and this victory on a so distant PTO improved a lot the 
strategic position of Great Britain at sea. It is important to properly underline 
how massive the British effort to defend a so distant PTO had been. When the 
decision to deploy the Invincible and the Inflexible to the South Atlantic was 
reached, The British Admiralty had only 9 modern battle-cruisers, with only 6 
of them in home waters
49
, so that 33% (which mean a full third!) of the entire 
available battle-cruiser force was immediately dispatched to defend a clearly 
peripheral theatre of operations (PTO). 
Another naval peripheral theatre of operations in World War I was that at 
the Dardanelles. The heavily fortified Turkish positions defending the Straits 
                                                          
46  For the story of Emden, see JACQUES MORDAL, Twenty-five centuries of sea warfare, 
Abbey Library, 1973, pp. 293-301.  
47  For this episode and the two battles it led to – those at Coronel and off the Falklands – see ibid., 
pp. 266-270 and Richard Humble (ed.), Naval warfare. An illustrated history, Silverdale Books, 
2004, pp. 136-139.  
48  For the technological features of both the British and the German battle-cruisers which 
fought the battle off the Falklands, see Tony Gibbons (general editor), The encyclopedia of ships, 
Silverdale Books, 2001, pp. 318-319 and 326.  
49  JOHN COSTELLO, TERRY HUGHES, op. cit., p. 61.  
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linking the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea were strongly attacked, along several 
years, by the Entente. The strategic goal of such a move was an important part 
of a peripheral grand strategy, aiming to completely defeat first of all at least 
one of the peripheral allies of Germany, and only afterwards the core element 
of the Central Powers. The earliest attacks took place on November 3
rd
, 1914, 
when several British and French major warships shelled the forts defending the 
Dardanelles. In February 1915, 18 heavy warships of the Entente were already 
concentrated off the Dardanelles. The first major attempt to break through the 
Straits took place on March 18
th
, 1915, when three large ships (a French one and 
two British) were sunk when they hit a minefield, and a fourth capital ship (a 
British battle-cruiser) was badly damaged and had to be immediately abandon 
the mission. Failing to break the Turkish defences only by naval bombardment, 
the Entente staged a massive landing operation, using large British and 
Australian and New Zealand (ANZAC) units. Again, very large resources were 
used in order get decisive (or at least important) results on a very distant 
peripheral theatre of operations. The 18 major warships of the Entente used to 
shell the Turkish forts protecting the Dardanelles represented an important share 
of the total naval forces of Great Britain and France (in the opening stages of 
World War I, the British had 21 dreadnoughts, 40 older battleships and 9 modern 
battle-cruisers, while the French had only 4 dreadnoughts and 18 older battleships
50
; 
these figures, put together, generate a grand total of 92 major ships, and those 
18 large ships deployed to the Dardanelles represent a share of almost 20% of 
the total available forces, a really  very large percentage for a PTO).  
 
 
Final remarks 
 
All the four case studies selected for this not very large presentation have 
a clear common denominator: they prove (even if with different intensities) that, 
at least sometimes, peripheral theatres of operations (PTOs) can play a really 
important role in shaping the final results of major strategic confrontations. 
And, sometimes, final results of such major strategic confrontations can be 
influenced more by partial results on PTOs than by the results of the effort to 
control (which means to conquer or to maintain) the central theatres of 
operations (CTOs). At least two major topics have to be more properly 
investigated, with a lot of extra details, in some future studies I am already 
planning: first of all, the problem of PTOs after World War I (PTOs in World 
War II, together with answers to questions as “were PTOs important in the 
context of the Cold War?” and “is there any central theatre of operations (CTO) 
– and, if they do exist, where PTOs are placed – in the context of the global war 
                                                          
50  HELMUT PEMSEL, op. cit., p. 198.  
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against terror?”. Secondly, a large amount of attention might be paid to the 
problem of synergetic PTOs in more recent times (for example, “did PTOs 
generate synergetic consequences in more recent times, in a way resembling, for 
example, the Peloponnesian War?”).  
 
 
 
ON CENTRE AND PERIPHERY: A BRIEF SURVEY OF GRAND STRATEGIES 
AND MILITARY STRATEGIES FOCUSED ON PERIPHERIAL 
THEATRES OF OPERATIONS (PTOs) 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
First of all, the study explores three different meanings of centre (centrality) and periphery 
(peripheral status) on the international arena. Then, the author presents four case studies (that of Athens 
in the context of the Peloponnesian War in the 5th century B.C., that of the campaigns of Alexander 
the Great, that of some of the campaigns of Napoleon and that of naval operations in World War I) 
which are significant for better understanding what fighting wars on peripheral theatres of operations 
(PTOs) means. The study offers compact definitions of central theatres of operations (CTOs) and 
peripheral theatres of operations (PTOs). Constraints, limits, costs, consequences, synergetic effects of 
all sorts, relatively stable correlations of resources, goals and results (all these significant both for 
the level of military strategy and for that of grand strategy) are taken into account. Major positive 
results (strategic successes) and negative results (together with the strategic mistakes generating 
them) in campaigns fought on PTOs are evaluated with a lot of details.  
Keywords: central theatre of operations (CTO); peripheral theatre of operations (PTO); 
grand strategy; military strategy; synergetic strategic consequences; war. 
 
16 
